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Georgia Reacts to Russian Pressure
By JABA DEVDARIANI
UN Association of Georgia
Over the last month, Russia's campaign of pressure and intimidation against Georgia 
has backfired. By threatening Georgia and by bombing its territory, Russia's leadership 
has revived Western fears that the conflict in Chechnya may spill over into the South 
Caucasus. Moreover, the onslaught has bolstered Georgia's President Eduard 
Shevardnadze and enabled him to solidify his position inside the country. If present 
positive tendencies in Georgia's response to this crisis continue, it will have proven itself 
a cohesive state, giving the lie to some Western analysts who had rushed to label 
Georgia a "failed state."
UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY AGGRESSION 
At dawn of August 23, three Russian warplanes bombed Georgian territory adjacent to 
the Chechen sector of the Russian border, leaving one civilian dead and at least seven 
injured. Despite the statements of Georgian officials and the OSCE observers 
confirming this incident, Russia has denied that its military participated in the attacks. 
However, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov called the attack "a step in the 
right direction," suggesting Georgians have bombed the villages themselves to crack 
down on Chechen guerrillas.(1)
Mr. Ivanov's cynical remarks did not come as a surprise: He has been a leading 
contributor to the recent buildup of pressure from Moscow for Russian military 
involvement in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Since July, sources in the Kremlin and Ivanov 
have decried Georgia's purported inability to halt lawlessness in the gorge and have 
argued for direct Russian involvement to put an end to the "enclave of terrorism."(2)
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The actions of the Russian military over the past month have shown that Ivanov was not 
bluffing. Clearly, the degree of military aggression Russia has been willing to use 
against Georgia in recent months is unprecedented. Although Russia has violated 
Georgia's air space and bombed villages repeatedly over the last three years, now the 
frequency and intensity of the attacks are escalating and leading to loss of life.
Since July 29 five cases of Georgian airspace violation were recorded of the Russo-
Georgian borders adjacent to Chechnya and to Georgia's secessionist region of 
Abkhazia. On at least three occasions, Russian jets or gunship helicopters opened fire 
on Georgian territory.
On the ground, twice in the past two months Russian paratroopers of the Abkhazia 
"peacekeeping forces" moved against the Kodori Gorge, the only area of Abkhazia still 
under the control of Georgian authorities. Russian Major-General Vasily Prizemlyn, the 
commander of the joint "peacekeeping force" in yet another post-conflict region of 
Georgia, South Ossetia, expanded the borders of his mission on August 22 and moved 
his troops to build trenches and checkpoints on Georgian territory.(3)
In all of these cases, Russia's political leaders refused to justify or admit responsibility 
for this behavior despite Georgian protests. And although Russian ground troops 
returned to their original locations after official Georgian protests, on one occasion the 
sides were balanced on the brink of military engagement with a standoff in Kodori 
Gorge between the Georgian militias and Russian paratroopers.(4)
Although military activities led the way in pressuring all sensitive points of the troubled 
Georgian terrain, political and economic levers also were activated. On August 8, 2002, 
Russian negotiators failed to appear for a discussion of the framework agreement on 
friendship between the two countries. According to the official explanation, the Russian 
experts were "not ready" to discuss the details; however, Georgian officials hinted that 
the Russian denial may have been used as an additional device to convince official 
Tbilisi of the need for "joint" military action in Pankisi. Supporting this version is the fact 
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that, as late as July 27, both sides were quoted to be optimistic about the outcome of 
the talks on the agreement.(5)
Reaching a settlement of the framework agreement has been one of the major foreign 
policy tasks for President Shevardnadze's leadership. The issue is closely tied to the 
(increasingly putative) withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Georgia, as well as 
improved protection of the rights of tens of thousands of Georgian citizens presently 
working in Russia.
Economically, Russian gas giant ITERA in August was close to gaining control of the 
Tbilisi gas distribution network in what some analysts described as a hostile takeover 
rooted in political pressures and corruption. The head of the budgetary office of the 
parliament, Roman Gotsiridze, and independent expert Sandro Tvaltchrelidze 
expressed fears that gaping loopholes in the ITERA draft contract might allow the 
company to acquire the title to the strategic energy distribution facilities in return for 
writing off government debts, as previously happened in neighboring Armenia.(6) 
ITERA, which at present is a major gas supplier to Georgia, became infamous for 
cutting off the gas supplies at critical points of Russo-Georgian relations.
Specific cases of pressure were accompanied by a massive public relations campaign 
in most state-influenced Russian media outlets, which accused Georgia of sustaining 
Chechen resistance by allowing Chechen fighters to use fallback positions in Pankisi. In 
this light, the military involvement of the Russian side was presented as an inevitable 
and logical consequence, while Georgia's position was depicted as consistently and 
purposefully damaging to Russian interests. In a symptomatic statement in the wake of 
the August 23 bombardments, Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the foundation Politika, 
called the Georgian president "a top-class provocateur."(7)
Not surprisingly, in express-polling by the radio station Ekho Moskvy on August 26, a 
stunning 58% of some 3,000 polled Russians said Moscow should not apologize for the 
bombing raids even if they were confirmed to be carried out by Russia. This is a 
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particularly high proportion in view of the fact that the listeners of Ekho Moskvy are 
liberal Muscovites, the segment of the population that would be least susceptible to 
government propaganda.
ATTEMPT TO DRAG GEORGIA INTO CHECHEN WAR 
Although the intensity of Russian pressure has reached unprecedented levels in the last 
two months, neither the methods nor the rationale are new. Russian officials have 
persistently attempted to secure Georgian military and diplomatic support for the second 
Chechen campaign since late 1999. As early as August 1999, when the fighting was 
limited to Daghestan, then-President Boris Yel'tsin asked Shevardnadze for consent to 
fly missions against Chechnya from Russian bases in Georgia.
According to Radio Liberty military analyst Koba Liklikadze, there have been at least 25 
cases of Georgian airspace violation since the launch of the second military campaign 
in Chechnya in 1999.(8) In all cases save one, Russia has denied its complicity.
Political and economic pressure also was applied, when Russia unilaterally introduced 
the visa regime with Georgia in December 2000. Russian officials' statements were far 
from friendly. In a telling example, President Vladimir Putin, commenting on 
Shevardnadze's protests against airspace violations at the CIS Summit in November 
2001, said that if the Russian air force had opened fire, there would have been 
casualties.(9)
The logic of Russian accusations is simple. According to the mainstream argument, 
many (depending on the source from hundreds to thousands) Chechen terrorists 
purportedly entered Georgia with a wave of refugees, and now are maintaining training 
camps in or near Pankisi while periodically infiltrating Chechnya to revive the resistance. 
Since Georgian law enforcement agencies are incapable of restoring order in the 
Pankisi Gorge, the argument continues, Russian military involvement is needed.
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Admittedly, weakness and negligence on the part of the Georgian government made it 
possible for Pankisi to become a comfortable refuge to all sorts of criminals, possibly 
including former combatants in Chechnya. However, the problem of Pankisi is rooted in 
the region's complex ethno-political history and defies simplistic assessments. Recipes 
for a military solution in Pankisi can be fatal to Georgia.(10)
Currently, even some Russian experts affirm the fallacy of the Russian argument: 
Pankisi is not a cause, but rather an effect, of Russia's failure to find a solution to the 
Chechen problem.(11)
It is possible to argue, however that the implicit main aim of the Russian pressures on 
Georgia was to prevent internationalization of the Chechen conflict. Russian strategy is 
aimed at rendering non-credible the statements or actions of Georgia, to isolate it from 
Western support and gain Southern-tier backup for its military actions in Chechnya. 
Georgia, for its part, sees the West, and the US in particular, as its only hope to protect 
the country from the spillover of the conflict.
Russian pressure in Georgia developed in noticeable waves, peaking immediately after 
arrival of Chechen refugees in 2000, in the beginning of 2001, in the Fall of 2001 and in 
Summer 2002.
The main substance of the first wave of pressure in 2000 was to silence Chechen 
journalists in Georgia who continued to provide Western news agencies with alternative 
coverage of the second Chechen war.(12) At that time, Russian security and military 
forces were starting to put a tight lid on information from Chechnya to avoid the negative 
coverage in the Russian news agencies that drained the first campaign of popular 
support and made it unsustainable.
This wave of pressure was spearheaded by representatives of the Russian foreign 
ministry, and was rebuffed rather easily by their Georgian counterparts appealing to 
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Georgia's international obligations under refugee conventions and the freedom of press 
in the country.
In the beginning of 2001, the protracted US presidential elections may have helped 
Russia to convince Georgian leadership that support from the US Department of State 
would not be forthcoming, thereby inducing Tbilisi to make strategic concessions to 
Moscow. Partly as a result of the popular perception that Eduard Shevardnadze might 
yield to these pressures, government popularity started to decline sharply that spring. At 
this stage, Georgia's official position was to deny any presence of Chechen militants on 
its territory.
In Fall 2001, Georgia's ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), was on the 
brink of collapse, while Shevardnadze's popularity was at a record low of 6 percent. The 
events of September 11 seemed to present the Russian leadership with a clear chance 
to reaffirm its strategic influence over Georgia. In his very first reaction to the attacks, 
President Putin expressed his determination to crack down on "terrorist hideouts" near 
Russia's borders, implicitly asking for the US go-ahead in Pankisi.
POST-SEPTEMBER 11 REALITIES 
The fallout from the September 11 attacks has had a significant effect on the Pankisi 
issue, and, in many ways, an unexpected effect for the Russian leadership. Instead of 
gaining a carte blanche concerning activities within its former sphere of influence, 
Russia has had to acquiesce in direct US presence in that sphere, particularly in Central 
Asia and Georgia.
Since September 2001, Georgia has admitted to a minor presence of Chechen 
guerrillas on its territory, which it ascribes to the deteriorating criminal situation in 
Pankisi, an admission made in response to the new understanding between Russia and 
the US on zero tolerance towards terrorism. According to expert information, upon his 
visit to the United States in October 2001, Eduard Shevardnadze was strongly urged to 
take action against terrorism in Pankisi.(13)
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However, rather than yielding to Russian pressures, Shevardnadze asked for US 
assistance, which was officially announced on February 28, 2002 in the form of the 
Georgia Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP). According to the plan, up to 200 US military 
instructors are to provide the Georgian defense ministry, border defense department 
and security services with anti-terrorist capabilities. The GTEP was launched officially in 
March 2002.
According to some sources, the US decision was not influenced by any new information 
about the presence of Arab-linked terrorists, but rather had to do with the need to 
prevent possible Russian military involvement in Pankisi.(14)
The announcement of the arrival of the US trainers to Georgia was met by fury in 
partisan political circles in Russia, but the official response from President Putin was in 
a lower key. Even today, many in Russia allege that the US has covert plans to push 
Russia out of the Caucasus. A military supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta went as far 
as to suggest that Washington is planning its own military incursion into Chechnya.(15)
But the real barrier to Russian policy is the fact that Georgia feels more confident in its 
ability to tackle the Pankisi issue independently, while the United States consistently 
affirms the right of the Georgian government to deal with the gorge without Russian 
engagement.(16)
In recent months Georgian police and security forces have arrested several Chechen 
guerrillas, some of whom were charged with illegally crossing the Georgian borders. At 
least two were charged with terrorist crimes. Some of these persons were handed over 
to Russia under extradition agreements. If these trends continue, the main arguments 
Russia used to justify its pressure on Georgia would be vitiated.
TRYING TO WEAKEN GEORGIAN SECURITY
If this logic is correct, the recent Russian pressures could be interpreted as meant to 
expose weaknesses within the Georgian security establishment, thereby threatening the 
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government's stability both domestically and internationally, as well as possibly 
undermining the US-led GTEP program.
It is possible to argue that the incidents of July-August 2002 were aimed at forcing the 
Georgian police, security and defense troops into action before the completion of GTEP, 
before their confidence and capabilities were built up with US assistance. Russia, by 
posing tactical threats in multiple directions ‹ Pankisi, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia ‹ 
would prevent the concentration of the limited Georgian capabilities and personnel.
In fact, external pressure (from both the US and Russia) as well as domestic intolerance 
of continued lawlessness in Pankisi induced Georgian decision-makers to launch the 
anti-criminal operation in Pankisi Gorge on August 25. Some 1,000 servicemen of the 
interior and state security ministries went into the gorge, while some 1,500 Ministry of 
Defense soldiers backed up the operation. Notably, the third, field-training phase of 
GTEP was launched simultaneously.
Committing the major part of its capable operational force to one tactical direction 
certainly is a risky decision. However, in case of success Georgia would take a major 
step toward deflecting future Russian pressures. At the same time, President 
Shevardnadze can seriously improve his shaken credibility among the public, which is 
crucial before the parliamentary elections of 2003.
Several recent developments constitute a bad omen for Russian interests. Importantly, 
Moscow's aggressive stance and the dreaded possibility of direct Russian military 
involvement seem to have made the ethnic Kists (who are Georgian citizens) and 
Chechens more accommodating to the Georgian military presence in Pankisi Gorge. 
Thus the scenario of ethnic confrontation most feared in Georgia likely will be avoided, 
at least in the short term.
Secondly, there has been generally unequivocal support for the government actions 
from usually fragmented partisan quarters in Georgia. Most of the political parties 
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sought an even tougher stance toward Russia while parliamentary decrees called for 
secession from the Commonwealth of Independent States and the withdrawal of all 
Russian troops from Georgia. Even groups that usually support Russia, such as the 
Socialist Party, have backed current governmental actions and called for joint 
investigation of the bombing incident. At present a pro-Russian position can throw any 
Georgian politician into oblivion.
Certainly, Georgia remains fragile. And the main threat may, paradoxically, come from 
the United States, which is impatient to see specific results from the antiterrorist 
operation. In a telling example of this logic, STRATFOR, an influential US thinktank, 
claimed recently that the "current toothless" anti-terrorism crackdown by Georgian 
forces in the gorge "will benefit only al Qaeda and its local Islamist allies."(17) In fact, 
the only realistic aim of the Georgian police forces has to be preserving relative stability 
in the gorge, avoiding major bloodshed and maintaining at least the passive support of 
the local population.
Establishment of interior troop checkpoints deep inside the gorge constitutes a definite 
success for the Georgian government. If the current situation is maintained through 
September, snow will block the mountain passes to Chechnya, rendering groundless 
any Russian claims about guerrillas crossing the border and providing crucial time to 
improve border control and crack down on guerrilla groups, should any remain.
Hence the coming months will be critical for testing the self-preservation abilities of the 
Georgian army, Shevardnadze's leadership, and perhaps Georgian statehood itself, as 
well as Western comprehension that preservation of Georgian independence 
constitutes a major international interest.
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